When the Guardrails Disappear: Why Mining Companies Face Greater Risk in West Africa Today
Why the retreat of development actors is reshaping the operating landscape, and what the private sector must do next.
For years, mining companies operating in West Africa benefited from a crowded ecosystem of development, humanitarian, and governance actors whose programs - intentionally or indirectly - reduced the risks of working in fragile borderlands and frontier markets. Aid-funded governance capacity building, NGOs addressing community grievances, stabilization programs strengthening local security relationships, and preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE) initiatives disrupting jihadist recruitment pipelines all helped create a more predictable operating environment. Today, much of that ecosystem is gone after the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was dismantled in early 2025. And the consequences are deeply destabilizing for the people and areas that benefitted from these interventions, and as a consequence, for private sector actors operating in these frontier markets.
Over the past nine months, humanitarian and development footprints have receded dramatically across the region. In USAID’s absence, the U.S. government’s foreign assistance tools have been reduced to a mere percentage of what they used to be. Other donors are following the same trajectory, reducing their aid overseas in favor of defense and counter migration spending domestically. This has effectively removed the scaffolding that once absorbed local grievances, strengthened government capabilities (including building industry and logistics/infrastructure to support industry growth), and helped deter extremist expansion.
A New Era of Exposure for Mining Operators
I was invited to speak about the impacts of these cuts on mining interests in West Africa at the annual West Africa Mining and Security (WAMS) conference in Accra, Ghana in September. I shared our understanding of the new operating environment and how, based on SSA’s operational position, we assume the impacts of these shifts will impact mining operations in this region. The guardrails that once softened political and security volatility are disappearing, and the consequences for the private sector are significant, as these companies now face heightened operational, regulatory and security volatility, just as global demand for minerals surges.
A Perfect Storm of Democratic Back-sliding and Security Threats
The reduction in foreign assistance coincides with a period of political upheaval in West Africa: coup d’etats and democratic backsliding Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Niger and Chad were quickly followed by rising resource nationalism in these emerging markets. In the past, transparency programs like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and anti-corruption initiatives funded by USAID and European partners helped ensure predictable environments for investment and business operations. But with these guardrails eroding, states are reverting to opaque regulatory practices, sudden policy shifts, and contract renegotiations designed to maximize short-term political advantage for unstable coup leaders. For mining companies, these uncertainties mean:
Less predictable taxation and licensing processes;
Increased risk of expropriation or contract cancellation;
Greater exposure to corruption and compliance vulnerabilities; and,
Politicization of environmental and social oversight
These political dynamics would be challenging on their own. But they intersect with a worsening security landscape shaped by terrorist expansion from the Sahel (Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso). The region is now the world’s epicenter of terrorism, and extremist groups - particularly the al-Qaeda aligned Jama’a Nusrat ul‑Islam wa al‑Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) - are quickly pushing southwards into Coastal West Africa (namely, Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire and to lesser extent Guinea, Senegal and Mauritania for now). These groups have adapted expansionist strategies in recent years focused on targeting the corridors and economic nodes that underpin state authority and foreign investment. Mining zones, logistics routes, and borderlands with weak state presence are among the most vulnerable, as we are currently seeing unfold in Mali, where JNIM has embargoed fuel shipments into the capital city Bamako, and effectively paralyzed the government.
Without international stabilization programs and sustained security cooperation from the US and Europe, states have fewer resources to contain these threats, and increasingly private companies could face the repercussions of these unconfined risks. For example, in areas of northern Mali and Burkina Faso where JNIM has pushed out state security forces, there have been several instances of mining companies and supply convoys being targeted and violently ambushed by terrorists.
Meanwhile, terrorist groups have become adept at exploiting local grievances - especially those linked to land disputes, exclusion from mining profits, and tensions between industrial and artisanal miners.
Economic Warfare: How Extremist Groups Leverage the Mining Sector
Terrorist networks in the region have not yet indicated that they seek to formally manage mines. Instead, what we can assess from their actions over the past decade is that these groups view mining as a strategic opportunity, by:
Disrupting national revenue streams by attacking mines, roads, or export routes
Financing their operations by taxing artisanal miners or providing armed “protection” to wells.
Equipping their operations by extracting or stealing explosives from mining sites for use in attacks
Positioning themselves as community protectors in places where state security is viewed as abusive or absent
These tactics simultaneously weaken central governments, generate revenue, and expand terrorist influence, all while increasing operational risk for mining companies. With development aid significantly reduced, there are fewer interventions mitigating the factors that fuel recruitment. Mining companies are now increasingly exposed to risks that development programs once absorbed.
Industrial mining operations rely on fragile logistics networks and infrastructure for fuel, equipment, and export routes - systems that development initiatives have often helped build or sustain. When these corridors become contested, insurance premiums spike, transport becomes unpredictable, and the viability of operating in remote regions rapidly diminishes. In the central Sahel, for instance, gold production has fallen sharply as security has deteriorated amid JNIM’s unchecked territorial expansion. Political dynamics also shape operational feasibility: Niger, for example, has been unable to export uranium as it attempts to nationalize this sector and push out the French owned company Orano, compounded by the fact that the only port equipped to handle uranium shipments is in Cotonou, Benin - whose government has been in political dispute with Niamey since the 2023 coup.
The Critical Minerals Imperative - and Why It Matters
At the same time that risks are increasing, the global demand for minerals - particularly those designated as “critical” for technology and energy transitions - is soaring. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), geopolitical tensions are underscoring the urgent need for stronger action on critical mineral security. The United States Department of the Interior defines “critical minerals” as those essential to economic or national security and whose supply chains are vulnerable to disruption.
For mining companies operating in West Africa, this means they are operating at the nexus of two powerful forces: heightened risk and skyrocketing strategic importance. The minerals extracted in this region - iron ore, bauxite, uranium, gold, manganese, zinc, phosphate, lithium, or other inputs like mercury - are not just financial assets but also geo-strategic assets. The global energy transition depends on West African supply chains, which positions mining companies operating in these frontier markets in strategic roles.
Illicit Economies Filling the Void
As humanitarian and development actors withdraw, illicit networks often expand to fill economic and governance gaps. In general, in ungoverned spaces, illicit networks will fill the governance vacuums in order to ensure that service delivery continues. Gold smuggling, fuel smuggling, weapons flows, and human trafficking all converge around mining corridors which usually exist in these under-governed spaces. Artisanal and illegal mining increasingly encroaches on industrial concessions, introducing environmental degradation which can lead to conflict between miners and communities, and opportunities for criminal or armed actors to embed themselves. For example, the Lafarge case in Syria demonstrates the cost of operating without institutional safeguards, wherein companies in conflict zones become vulnerable to extortion economies, coercion by armed actors, and severe legal liability when governance collapses.
The reduction in donor-funded governance and law enforcement capacity means fewer checks on illicit activity, and greater exposure for companies whose concessions now overlap with criminal economies. Moreover, without rule-of-law programs and community development projects, companies are now the primary actors confronting illicit encroachment.
Communities Are More Vulnerable, and Mining Companies Are Now On The Front Line
One of the most immediate consequences of USAID’s retreat is the growing visible distress in local communities: 6 million additional people across Africa have fallen below the poverty line in the past year and a recent study estimates that USAID cuts have already resulted in over half a million deaths globally due to starvation and lack of access to basic health services the agency once provided.
As services shrink and poverty rises, resentment grows toward actors, like mining companies, that are seen as materially benefiting from extractives, while the communities that sit on these resources lose out on the revenue streams or development aid. Mining companies, once insulated by development programs that provided jobs, services and social cohesion support, now face escalating demands for companies to fund basic services in the communities they operate in, and as such, greater likelihood of local protests and conflicts spilling into operations.
Where the U.S. and Europeans absorbed local anger by delivering clinics, water systems or schools, communities increasingly might redirect their frustration towards private firms - who might be the only people present in these far flung communities now that USAID is gone. The departure of stabilizing actors like humanitarian NGOs leaves private actors more exposed, and less buffered, than ever, with their social license to operate in these spaces being critically reviewed.
Filling the Gap: What Mining Companies Must Do Now
With traditional safeguards gone, mining companies must adopt a new operating posture:
Deepen ESG and community engagement: ESG is no longer a compliance checkbox - it is the foundation of operational stability in fragile environments. Local hiring and workforce development are essential, not only to expand economic participation but also to reinforce a company’s social license to operate with both communities and national governments. Transparent communication, accessible grievance mechanisms, and credible environmental safeguards help prevent backlash and build trust in areas where state institutions are weak or absent.
Investing in basic services also strengthens operational resilience. For example, with USAID’s health and anti-malaria programs no longer present, untreated illness is becoming a major driver of absenteeism in local workforces. Supporting community health, education, or water access is not charity - it is a strategic investment in a stable, capable labor pool and a more secure operating environment.
Invest in real-time risk intelligence: U.S government partners funded by USAID are no longer generating the ground-level insights that informed diplomacy and risk advice in West Africa. Although private companies usually have their own security teams, open source reporting on emergent threats, trends and analysis is now deeply hampered by the absence of these research networks and NGO partners. Companies must now build their own situational awareness. This requires visibility not only into local threat actors, but also into the regional and cross-border dynamics that shape West Africa’s fluid risk environment. Political shifts or armed group activity in a neighboring country can rapidly alter the security landscape where a company operates. For example, as mining interests scale up in Guinea, JNIM’s southward push from northern Mali to the border with Guinea could affect operations, even though no terrorist activity has been reported yet.
For years, USAID-funded NGOs working in remote border areas gathered critical insights that informed U.S. and partner-nation diplomatic decision-making. With many of these organizations now withdrawing or shutting down, that information pipeline has largely disappeared. Mining companies are often the only actors left consistently present in frontier zones, and the security reporting that once guided risk assessments is far less available.
Conclusion: Operating Without a Net
West Africa remains one of the most strategically important regions in the world for the global energy transition. But as development and humanitarian actors withdraw, mining companies must shoulder unprecedented responsibilities for stability, compliance, and security.
At SSA, our experience in conflict research, community security, stabilization, and risk intelligence makes one thing clear: Mining companies cannot succeed in this new environment without a deep understanding of the conflicts, grievances, and geopolitical forces reshaping the region.
The guardrails are gone. The risks are real. But with the right intelligence and engagement strategies, businesses can still operate safely, and contribute to stability where it is needed most.
